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Protecting Franchisees from
Abusive Arbitration Clauses
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT'
n two recent articles in this
Journal, Edward Wood Dun-
ham suggested that franchisors
may wish to use arbitration clauses
to achieve ends that are often pro-
scribed by courts and legislatures
in the litigation context.2 Specifi-
cally, Mr. Dunham's most recent
article urges franchisors to consid-
er the use of arbitration clauses to
"manage franchisor risk." He notes
that arbitration clauses can be used Jean R. Sternlight
to eliminate franchisees' right to a
jury trial, to select a geographic forum favorable to a fran-
chisor but not necessarily to a franchisee, and to limit avail-
able damages.' The earlier article advised franchisors that
they could use arbitration clauses as a "shield" against class
actions, specifically by attempting to eliminate any fight that
franchisees might have had to join in a class action against a
franchisor in either litigation or arbitration.'
Why should franchisors be able to accomplish ends that
would be proscribed in litigation merely by inserting their
ideal language in an arbitration clause? Perhaps they should
not. As Mr. Dunham himself admits, "[a]s a theoretical mat-
ter, the elevated status of arbitration agreements is difficult to
justify."5
Although the pro-arbitration U.S. Supreme Court has
issued numerous decisions stating that arbitration is favored,6
it has never gone so far as to say that putting an otherwise
improper or illegal clause inside an arbitration agreement
somehow immunizes that clause from attack. Instead, the
Court has emphasized that where an arbitration clause can be
shown to deprive a claimant of substantive rights, it "would
have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against
public policy."7 Additionally, the Court has repeatedly
explained that arbitration is supposed to be merely the sub-
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stitution of an alternative viable forum for litigation, and that
it should not accomplish a denial of substantive rights. The
Court has stated that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbi-
tral, rather than a judicial, forum."8 Thus, in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.,9 the Court carefully examined the
particular form of arbitration that had been mandated, and
stood ready to invalidate the arbitration had it found that the
forum was insufficient to protect the plaintiff's rights."
(continued on page 70)
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Abusive Arbitration Clauses
(continued from page 45)
This article sets out a number of legal arguments that fran-
chisees can potentially use to defeat arbitration clauses that
seek to accomplish ends that would not be permissible in liti-
gation. Drawing from decisions protecting consumers and
employees from unfair arbitration clauses, as well as from
opinions in the franchise context, this article analyzes argu-
ments that can be based on the U.S. Constitution, federal
statutes, state statutes, and common law. By way of this
analysis, it suggests that some courts are misapplying arbitra-
tion precedents and preemption arguments to support deci-
sions that allow franchisors to effectively exempt themselves
from legislation and even constitutional provisions that
would protect franchisees.
This article also calls for legislative reform. To the extent
that courts go too far in allowing franchisors and others to
use arbitration clauses to insulate themselves from legal lia-
bility, Congress will need to take corrective action. Several
bills currently pending in Congress are summarized in the
conclusion of this article.
Current Use of Arbitration Clauses
The inclusion of arbitration clauses by franchisors in their
agreements is a common rather than exceptional event, and
these clauses often include far more than a mere requirement
of arbitration. Professor Christopher Drahozal recently stud-
ied the Uniform Franchise Offering Circulars and franchise
agreements filed by seventy-five leading franchisors in Min-
nesota and found that 45 percent contained arbitration claus-
es." The vast majority of these arbitration clauses (82
percent) required that arbitration take place in the fran-
chisor's home location; 12 75 percent sought to preclude
recovery of punitive damages; 13 most clauses required fran-
chisees to arbitrate all claims but allowed franchisors to liti-
gate certain claims;' 4 almost half of the clauses explicitly
precluded use of class actions, and several others that pre-
cluded consolidation might have been intended to accom-
plish the same end; 5 several clauses provided for de novo
hearings if recovery by franchisees (but not franchisors)
exceeded a certain amount;' 6 and one clause prohibited the
arbitrator from awarding attorneys' fees."' Thus, it seems that
many franchisors are already heeding the advice provided by
Mr. Dunham and others.' 8
Is there any reason to be concerned about franchisors' use
of arbitration clauses to secure apparent advantages over
franchisees? Professor Drahozal argues not necessarily,
asserting that clauses that appear to be unfairly biased in
favor of franchisors may in fact provide benefit to franchisees
as well.' 9 Perhaps the franchisors pass on their reduced litiga-
tion expenses to the franchisees, and perhaps the gains
secured by the franchisors exceed the losses imposed on the
franchisees. Thus, he asserts that rational well-informed fran-
chisees might voluntarily elect such seemingly unfair clauses
in order to secure other advantages such as a cheaper fran-
chise.2 ° Professor Drahozal also contends that many fran-
chisees are experienced and well-informed businesspersons,
who are quite capable of reading contracts carefully and tai-
loring dispute resolution clauses to their own needs.2'
In comparison with Professor Drahozal, this author is far
more pessimistic about the impact that such clauses likely
will have on franchisees. I suspect that many franchisees,
though certainly not all, do not comprehend the full implica-
tions of accepting an arbitration clause. Even assuming that
franchisees read all the fine print of the franchise agreement,
they may not entirely understand what arbitration is, that
their right to a jury trial has been eliminated, that they likely
will not have access to as much discovery as they would have
had in litigation, and that it is virtually impossible to overturn
an arbitrator's ruling. Such franchisees also may not be cog-
nizant of the implications of clauses that would require them
to arbitrate in distant locations,, shorten a statute of limita-
tions, prevent them from proceeding in a class action, or pre-
clude their recovery of certain kinds of relief. To use
economists' terminology, such franchisees are very much
lacking in the "perfect information" that is necessary for a
market to work efficiently.22 That is, because the franchisees
do not possess adequate information to assess the costs that
are imposed by the seemingly biased clause, they will not
demand an appropriate reduction of price.2
Moreover, even assuming that franchisees read the fine
print of the dispute resolution clauses and understand their
implications, franchisors could still use the clauses to secure
an advantage. Psychologists have found that people are pre-
dictably overly optimistic and that they are typically more
willing to gamble on losses than on gains.24 In practical
terms, this means that even a completely knowledgeable
franchisee would predictably underestimate the likelihood of
getting into a dispute with the franchisor, and that even a
franchisor that accurately estimated the likelihood would typ-
ically be irrationally willing to gamble that it would not
occur. Given both phenomena, it is likely that a franchisee
would not demand an appropriately large concession on
other terms, such as price, to compensate for advantages that
the franchisor secured through the dispute resolution clause.
In the end, only empirical investigations will yield conclu-
sive answers to such questions as what the typical character-
istics of franchisees are, what impact arbitration clauses have
on franchisors and franchisees, and whether seemingly unfair
clauses actually benefit franchisees as well as franchisors.
But, lacking such information, which is not likely forthcom-
ing in the near future, we will all need to make our own best
judgments. Those franchisees and their attorneys who deter-
mine that a particular arbitration clause is disadvantageous
will need to search out legal arguments that might be used to
void the clause. Those who believe that legislative reform is
appropriate to protect franchisees or others will need to
muster their best evidence to convince Congress and state
legislatures that protection is needed. Once a legislature has
concluded that protective legislation is necessary and benefi-
cial, courts should not rely on their own economic theories to
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vitiate the law. That is, when courts, attorneys, or commenta-
tors suggest that courts should use economic arguments to
reject policies set out in legislation, they may be improperly
suggesting that judges substitute their own thinking for that
of the legislature.
Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer and
Employment Contexts
The practice of using standard form contracts to impose
mandatory binding arbitration is by no means unique to the
franchise arena. Employers are increasingly imposing such
clauses on their nonunionized employees. Banks are includ-
ing them in loan documents and checking account agree-
ments. Credit card companies are sending them out in small
print as part of "envelope stuffers" that are intermingled with
regular bills. Lenders or car dealers are putting them into car
loan contracts. Computer manufacturers are including them
in informational booklets sent out with mail-order comput-
ers. Medical providers are insisting that patients sign such
clauses along with medical consents. Pest exterminators are
placing them in the small print on the back of service con-
tracts. Mobile home dealers are inserting them into sales con-
tracts and even inconspicuously placing warranty booklets in
a drawer of the mobile home kitchen. According to one
report, even a cereal box
was found to contain an
arbitration provision."
As in the franchise con- In response to gl
text, the arbitration clauses
that are imposed on mandatory binc
employees and consumers number of arbitra
vary dramatically from
one another. Some require issued "due pr
arbitration before a non-
neutral arbitrator or pre-
clude the award of
otherwise available punitive damages, compensatory dam-
ages, attorneys' fees, and costs. Some shorten the statute of
limitations or explicitly prohibit class actions. Still others
select a geographic venue that is quite inconvenient to the
party on whom arbitration is imposed or impose arbitration
costs that are so high that they may realistically preclude the
filing of a demand for arbitration.
Although a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases have
largely supported business's imposition of mandatory arbitra-
tion in the consumer and employment settings, 2 6 the poten-
tially adverse and unfair effects of such clauses are
increasingly being recognized by some courts, policymakers,
arbitral organizations, and academic commentators. 27 Thus,
in some highly publicized cases, courts have refused to
enforce arbitration clauses that were found to have prevented
consumers or employees from adequately protecting their
federal statutory rights. For example, in Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co.,28 the Ninth Circuit held that employers
could not use mandatory predispute arbitration clauses to
compel employees to arbitrate their claims under Title VII.
Several other federal circuits have held that particular arbitra-
roy
in
Ic
tion clauses were unenforceable because they unduly restrict-
ed employees' opportunities to enforce their rights under fed-
eral statutes. 29 As well, federal courts have found that
mandatory arbitration can be inconsistent with the federal
bankruptcy code3" or with the Magnuson-Moss consumer
protection act.3' Courts have also refused to enforce a num-
ber of arbitration clauses imposed on consumers or employ-
ees on a variety of contractual grounds, including
unconscionability, 2 lack of an agreement,33 failure to accord
with reasonable expectations, 4 or fraud. 5
Meanwhile, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has taken a leading role in opposing the use of
mandatory arbitration in the employment context. It issued a
policy statement enunciating that predispute arbitration
agreements are "inconsistent with the [federal] civil rights
laws... -36 This statement emphasized that arbitration would
deny claimants a jury trial, limit discovery, deny class relief,
and allow repeat player/employers "to manipulate the arbitral
mechanism to [their] benefit.' 7
The securities industry was attacked so sharply for its
practice of compelling employees to arbitrate all employ-
ment and other disputes that it backed away from the prac-
tice. The change can be attributed to numerous news reports
that placed the industry's program in a bad light and to con-
gressional pressure.38
Finally, in response to
growing criticism of
wing criticism of mandatory binding arbitra-
tion, a number of arbitralig arbitration, a organizations have issued
irganizations have "due process protocols."
Issued protocols common-
ess protocols." ly oppose clauses that are
unfair and state or imply
that these arbitral organi-
zations will refuse to
administer such clauses. Arbitral unfairness has been spelled
out to include clauses that elect nonneutral arbitrators, deny
statutory remedies, eliminate adequate discovery, or impose
high costs. The best known of such protocols are the three
issued by the American Arbitration Association, in conjunc-
tion with other organizations, that deal with employment,
consumer claims, and medical care disputes.39 The health
care protocol, which goes the furthest in providing arbitral
process protections, permits only postdispute agreements to
binding arbitration.4' It has been endorsed by the American
Bar Association.4
Do Franchisees Need Special Protection?
Franchisees who believe that particular arbitration clauses do
not serve their interests may be able to defeat such clauses
using some of the same kinds of arguments that have worked
in the employment and consumer context. Although courts
and policymakers may not all view franchisees as sympathet-
ically as they view employees and consumers, numerous fed-
eral and state laws recognize that at least some franchisees
should be afforded special protection. Specifically, Congress,
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state legislatures, and the courts, after concluding that there
is often a significant power disparity between franchisors and
franchisees, have all taken steps to protect franchisees
against potentially unfair contractual agreements. Such pro-
tective legislation and court decisions are typically based on
a finding that franchisees often, if not always, are significant-
ly less sophisticated than franchisors. Franchisees may be
relatively uneducated persons who are using their life savings
to purchase a franchise. Also, franchisees may not always be
sophisticated enough to secure legal advice before entering
into franchise agreements, particularly when franchisors
push them to agree to terms quickly.
At the federal level, several bodies of law are designed to
protect franchisees from potential franchisor abuses. Most
generally, the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Trade
Regulation Rule, Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity
Ventures, 42 requires franchisors engaged in interstate com-
merce to make specific disclosures to potential franchisees.
Failure to make mandated disclosures is labeled an "unfair
or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of Section 5
[of the Federal Trade Commission Act]."4 The report issued
by the FTC in connection with the disclosure rule repeatedly
referenced such factors as "the relative lack of business
experience of most prospective franchisees, the highlighting
of unusually successful franchisees by franchisors and
the popular press, and...
the informational imbal-
ance present between
prospective franchisee Courts have fre
and franchisor...
In addition, Congress a jury trial waiv
has passed legislation franchise agi
geared to protect fran-
chisees from abusive prac- necessarily
tices in two specific
business areas. First, the
Automobile Dealer's Day
in Court Act45 was passed in 1956 "to balance the power now
heavily weighted in favor of automobile manufacturers. 4
This statute, which applies to franchise agreements between
automobile manufacturers and dealers, requires franchisors
to act in "good faith" in enforcing terms of the agreement or
in terminating the franchise.47 Second, the Petroleum Mar-
keting Practices Act (PMPA)48 limits the circumstances in
which motor fuel suppliers can terminate or fail to renew
contracts of their franchisees. Initially passed in 1978 and
amended in 1994, the PMPA was deemed necessary to cor-
rect the great "disparity of bargaining power" between petro-
leum franchisors and franchisees.49 In passing the PMPA, the
Senate noted franchisee complaints that petroleum franchise
agreements are "contracts of adhesion" and found that such
contracts "may translate the original disparity of bargaining
power into continuing vulnerability of the franchisee to the
demands and actions of the franchisor.' 5
State laws regarding franchises vary substantially. Some
states have concluded that the imbalance of power between
:q
(e
'e
e
franchisors and franchisees is such that franchisees must be
provided with special protections. For example, in Electrical
& Magneto Service Co. v. AMBAC International Corp., the
Eighth Circuit concluded that "the Missouri Legislature cre-
ated a legislative presumption that franchisees are in an infe-
rior bargaining position with respect to franchisors and thus
are entitled to protection from the oppressive use of the fran-
chisor's superiority. 5 2 In light of such findings, some states
have restricted the circumstances under which franchises
may be terminated," some have prohibited franchisors from
mandating out-of-state forums,54 some have required fran-
chisors to register before selling franchises within their
state," some have required that franchisors provide certain
disclosures to franchisees,56 and some have issued court deci-
sions interpreting antiwaiver provisions to prohibit fran-
chisors from using choice-of-law provisions to defeat claims
or defenses under local franchise law."7 On the other hand, a
substantial number of states do not have special legislation
geared to protect franchisees.
Attacking Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Imposed
on Franchisees
U.S. Constitution
The Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in cases
brought at common law potentially offers strong protection
to franchisees, although to
date courts have rarely
used it to void privately
uently held that imposed mandatory arbi-
tration clauses. The U.S.
contained in a Supreme Court and lower
ement is not courts have repeatedly
enunciated that the right to
nforceable. a jury trial may only be
waived knowingly and vol-
untarily and that courts
should "indulge every rea-
sonable presumption against waiver.""6 As the Court has
repeatedly observed, "itihe trial by jury is justly dear to the
American people. It has always been an object of deep inter-
est and solicitude, and every encroachment upon it has been
watched with great jealousy."5"
Taking into account the importance of the right to a jury
trial, courts have frequently held that a jury trial waiver con-
tained in a franchise agreement is not necessarily enforce-
able."' Rather, enforceability depends on such factors as: (1)
the parties' relative bargaining power, (2) the conspicuous-
ness of the waiver, (3) the degree to which the waiver was
bargained for, (4) the extent to which the agreement was sub-
ject to negotiation, and (5) the disparities between the par-
ties' business and professional experience." For example, in
AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Marino, 12 the district court
invalidated a jury trial waiver imposed on a franchisee in a
preprinted form contract. Emphasizing that "[n]o [fran-
chisee] . . . was able to negotiate the terms of his franchise
agreement or to alter any of its terms," 3 and that the fran-
72 Franchise Law Journal U FaIl 2000
HeinOnline -- 20 Franchise L.J. 72 2000-2001
chisees "possessed virtually no bargaining power," 64 the
court concluded that they did not voluntarily waive their
right to a jury trial. 5 Similarly, in Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors
of America, Inc.," the district court refused to enforce a jury
trial waiver contained in the dealer agreement signed by the
franchisee. It stated:
[Franchisors] have presented no evidence that the waiver provision
was a bargained for term of the contract, was mentioned during
negotiations, or was even brought to the [franchisees'] attention. In
fact, the [franchisors] have failed to show that the [frachisees] had
any choice other than to accept the contract as written. The 1978
Agreement appears to be Peugeot's standardized printed dealer
contract, drafted by Peugeot. Obviously, the [franchisees] had little,
if any, opportunity to negotiate the provisions. Absent proof to the
contrary, such an inequality in relative bargaining positions sug-
gests that the asserted waiver was neither knowing nor intentional.
7
Other courts have upheld a jury trial waiver contained in a
franchise agreement only because the particular franchisees
or other businesspersons were relatively knowledgeable and
sophisticated.68
Although it is clear that a binding arbitration agreement
necessarily includes a jury trial waiver,69 courts have not typ-
ically treated arbitration clauses as waivers of federal consti-
tutional rights." Parties seeking to challenge arbitration
agreements have not frequently made constitutional argu-
ments, and in the few
cases in which they have,
they have often met with
little success."' Arbitratio
Thus, courts have fre-
quently enforced arbitra- unenforceable v
tion clauses without persons from en
pausing to consider
whether the parties had under a fec
"knowingly and voluntari-
ly" waived their jury trial
right and without taking
into account the "presumption against waiver" of constitu-
tional rights. Instead, courts have often cited the Federal
Arbitration Act's "favoritism" toward arbitration in insisting
that form arbitration clauses are enforceable. They frequently
uphold arbitration clauses without taking into account the
factors that would normally be considered in construing a
jury trial waiver, such as the clarity of the waiver, its conspic-
uousness, and the parties' degree of knowledge, power, and
sophistication?12 Mr. Dunham states that in contrast to jury
trial waivers, "arbitration agreements are routinely enforced;
even when the clause was inconspicuous and never negotiat-
ed, there was clearly disparate bargaining power and the
franchisee never had a lawyer review the agreement.""7
Upon reflection, in those cases where a federal jury trial
would otherwise have been available, 74 courts' refusal to treat
contracts to binding arbitration as waivers of the jury trial
seems unjustified. Clearly, the federal Constitution trumps
any "favoritism" contained in a federal statute. Nor is it prop-
er for courts to simply sidestep the constitutional arguments,
by concluding that an "agreement" to arbitrate necessarily
n¢
foi
le
waives the jury trial right, without considering whether in
fact the jury trial right was properly waived.75 Were courts to
treat arbitration clauses properly as jury trial waivers, they
would not be compelled to void all such waivers. Numerous
cases within and without the franchise context have estab-
lished that jury trial waivers can be permitted in the commer-
cial context. 6 However, courts would be required to make a
determination of whether or not the arbitration agreement
had been entered into knowingly and voluntarily. In doing so,
they would need to consider factors such as the clarity of the
waiver and the relative knowledge and sophistication of the
parties. Thus, where franchisees are relatively knowledgeable
and sophisticated or where they secure legal representation,
courts will likely find that their jury trial right has been
knowingly and voluntarily waived. By contrast, in a situation
where a form contract is used to impose binding arbitration
on an unsophisticated franchisee, and particularly where that
franchisee has no legal representation or is given limited time
to review the contract, the Seventh Amendment argument
should often prevail.7"
Federal Statutes
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that arbitration claus-
es are unenforceable when they prevent persons from enforc-
ing their rights under a federal statute. As the Court has
repeatedly stated, courts
should compel arbitration
only "so long as the
:lauses are prospective litigant effec-
tively may vindicate [his
en they prevent or her] statutory cause of
rcing their rights action in the arbitral forum
[such that] the statute will
ral statute, continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent
function."7 Moreover, it is
clear that Congress has the
power to provide that claims brought under a particular
statute are not arbitrable."9 To determine whether Congress
has provided that claims under a particular statute are nonar-
bitrable, the Court has directed lower courts to consider not
only the text and legislative history of the statute, but also
whether there might be "an inherent conflict" between arbi-
tration and the statute's underlying purposes."'
Therefore, depending upon the language and legislative
history of the particular federal statute under which they
brought a claim, franchisees might be able to argue that a
given federal statute entirely prohibits mandatory arbitration.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc."
held in 1985 that car distributors had failed to show that Con-
gress intended to preclude arbitration of antitrust claims
brought in an international context, but left open the possibil-
ity that courts might interpret other federal legislation to pre-
clude arbitration altogether. 2 Outside the franchise context,
several courts have found that mandatory arbitration of par-
ticular claims was entirely precluded by a federal statute."1
Alternatively, franchisees might present the more narrow
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(and potentially more persuasive) argument that, even though
a particular federal statute does not entirely proscribe arbitra-
tion, the contested arbitration clause contains unfair terms
that would prevent franchisees from vindicating their federal
rights. A gasoline distributor successfully presented such an
argument to the Ninth Circuit in Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO
Products Co.84 In Graham Oil, the distributor argued that the
arbitration clause was invalid because it mandated the surren-
der of specific rights provided by the PMPA.85 In particular,
the clause (1) purported to forfeit the distributor's right to
recover exemplary damages permitted by the PMPA; (2) pro-
hibited recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees allowed by the
PMPA; and (3) shortened the distributor's statute of limita-
tions from one year to ninety days or, in some cases, six
months.86 After ruling that PMPA claims were not, as a gen-
eral rule, nonarbitrable, the Ninth Circuit struck the clause as
violating the PMPA. It stated:
[T]he fact that franchisees may agree to an arbitral forum for the res-
olution of statutory disputes in no way suggests that they may be
forced by those with dominant economic power to surrender the
statutorily-mandated rights and benefits that Congress intended them
to possess. This is certainly true in cases arising under the PMPA,
which was enacted to shield franchisees from the "gross disparity of
bargaining power" that exists between them and franchisors. If fran-
chisees could be compelled to surrender their statutorily-mandated
protections as a condition of obtaining franchise agreements, then
franchisors could use their superior bargaining power to deprive
franchisees of the PMPA's protections. In effect, the franchisors
could simply continue their earlier practice of presenting prospective
franchisees with contracts of adhesion that deny them the rights and
benefits afforded by Congress. In that way, the PMPA would quick-
ly be nullifedY"
The Graham Oil rationale can be extended to protect fran-
chisees' rights under other federal statutes such as the
antitrust laws or the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act when the arbitration clause is particularly egre-
gious. Courts have recognized that federal statutes may
potentially render arbitration clauses unenforceable where
the clause calls for a biased arbitrator,88 where it eliminates
certain types of relief,89 or where it imposes excessive costs.9"
Plaintiffs also might argue that they cannot be compelled
to arbitrate their claims under a particular federal statute
because arbitration would deprive them of their fight to pro-
ceed in a class action. In some cases, the viability of class
actions is critical to allow franchisees to bring their claims
against franchisors. A claim that might be too small or too
complex to be litigated by an individual franchisee may more
practically be pursued by a group of franchisees in a class
action. Class actions may be used where franchisees' factual
or legal claims are sufficiently similar to warrant class certifi-
cation and have been approved by the courts in the franchise
context for certain antitrust, fraud, or other claims.9'
In a case where the class action seems critical, franchisees
may seek to argue that the right to proceed by class action is
guaranteed by the language, legislative history, or purpose of
a particular federal statute. One Delaware district court deci-
sion, albeit one recently reversed on appeal, concluded that
the language, legislative history, and overall intent of the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) precluded a court from com-
pelling arbitration of a putative class action brought under that
statute.92 In so doing, the court focused on the legislative his-
tory of the TILA and, specifically, the damage cap for class
actions set out in section 1640. It stated that "[t]he intended
purpose of the TILA 'was to encourage class actions in the
truth-in-lending context because of the apparent inadequacy
of the Federal Trade Commission's enforcement resources
and because of a continuing problem of minimum compli-
ance with the Act on the part of creditors.' "9 Although this
argument was rejected on appeal and has been rejected by
several other courts,94 it provides an important example for
franchisees who might hope to prove the importance of pro-
ceeding by way of class action under the TILA or other
statutes. Note also that the U.S. Supreme Court may conceiv-
ably address the question of whether the TILA guarantees a
right to proceed by class action when it decides Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.95
The question of whether arbitration clauses can be voided
for eliminating class actions is particularly important in that a
number of federal courts have, albeit without adequate analysis,
rejected the possibility of proceeding by class action in arbitra-
tion, unless the arbitration clause specifically allows for arbitral
class actions.96 These decisions have led some franchisor attor-
neys to suggest that arbitration is a shield against class
actions. 97 However, these decisions fail to adequately explain
why a silent clause should be deemed to proscribe rather than
permit arbitral class actions98 and ignore significant differences
between consolidated arbitrations and class actions.99 Signifi-
cantly, both California and Pennsylvania state courts have
reached a contrary conclusion to the federal courts by holding
that class actions may proceed in arbitration.i" Both the Cali-
fornia and Pennsylvania decisions have required the judge to
play a very active role in such class issues as certification and
notice,'0 and attorneys who have handled arbitral class actions
in California report that active judicial participation is the
norm. ' 2 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on
whether class actions might be handled in arbitration, it has
suggested in dicta that such a proceeding might be possible.0 3
State Constitutions and Statutes
Many state constitutions and state statutes contain provisions
that franchisees might use to defeat mandatory arbitration
provisions. State constitutions often guarantee rights to a jury
trial or access to the courts, and a few courts have made men-
tion of such rights in striking mandatory arbitration claus-
es. 104 State statutes may provide for nonwaivable substantive
remedies, may regulate the way in which arbitration clauses
are provided to franchisees, or may purport to eliminate arbi-
tration altogether in certain contexts. In addition, many state
legislatures and state courts have prohibited franchisors from
requiring franchisees to file their claims in distant forums,
concluding that such clauses may impose an unfair and
sometimes impassable burden on franchisees who attempt to
protect their legal rights.0 5
However, franchisors are increasingly using arbitration
clauses to avoid these limitations. Several courts have explic-
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itly held that state legislatures have no right to prohibit forum
selection clauses contained in arbitration agreements, even
though they may restrict the use of forum selection clauses in
litigation. Specifically, these courts have concluded that the
application of the prohibition on forum selection clauses to
the arbitration context is preempted by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA)."' Where a state law is found to target arbi-
tration clauses for elimination, the U.S. Supreme Court and
lower courts have consistently found the provision to be pre-
empted. For example, in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarot-
to,'0 7 a 1995 case involving a Subway sandwich shop
franchise, the Court held that the FAA preempted a Montana
statute that regulated the placement of an arbitration provision
in a contract.'018 Ten years earlier, in Southland Corp. v. Keat-
ing, 10 9 the Court held that California's franchise statute was
preempted to the extent that it was interpreted to prohibit
arbitration of claims brought under that statute." 0
Nonetheless, it should
be possible for franchisees
to argue that certain state
constitutional provisions or
state statutes may void an In some cases
arbitration provision with- class actions is
out being preempted under
the FAA. Not all state laws franchisees to I
that might invalidate an against fi
arbitration clause are nec-
essarily preempted. Rather,
the U.S. Supreme Court
has repeatedly stated (as
does the FAA itself) that arbitration clauses may be voided
using general contract defenses such as unconscionability,
fraud, or duress. Moreover, the Court has emphasized that the
problematic state laws are those that target arbitration clauses,
and has never said that a law that seeks to protect franchisees
or others in both litigation and arbitration would be preempt-
ed. Thus, where an arbitration clause contains provisions that
would prevent franchisees from exercising their rights under
a particular state constitution or law, courts should be able to
void at least those aspects of the clause. Congress never
intended for arbitration to be a shield that companies could
use to impose egregious terms that would be impermissible in
the litigation context. Rather, Congress merely sought to
ensure that courts would not, on a general basis, refuse to
enforce arbitration provisions.
For example, despite several federal appellate decisions to
the contrary,"' franchisees should be able to void a forum
selection clause contained in an arbitration agreement where
state law prohibits clauses that mandate a foreign forum in
both litigation and arbitration." 2 The Montana Supreme
Court so held in 1998 in Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems
Corp.," concluding that state provisions barring Montana
residents from being required to litigate claims out of state
were not preempted by the FAA, and that an arbitration
clause imposed on an automotive parts distributor was unen-
forceable to the extent that it mandated out-of-state arbitra-
tion. 4 It explained:
;, t
bri
ra
[W]e read Casarotto to stand for the proposition that a state law
may not "place arbitration clauses on an unequal 'footing ".... As
we stated above, § 28-2-708, MCA, invalidates choice of forum
provision[s] in contracts generally. Section 27-5-323[,] MCA, does
the same to arbitration agreements. Montana law, therefore, does
not distinguish between forum selection clauses which are part of
contracts generally and forum selection clauses found in agreements
to arbitrate .... The lack of such a distinction is evidence that the
statute does not conflict with the FAA." 5
Similarly, state constitutional or statutory provisions that
protect generally against unknowing or involuntary loss of
the jury trial right, or against mandatory forum selection
clauses including arbitration, should not be held preempted.
Such provisions are not targeted against arbitration, but
rather are geared to protect certain rights in all contexts,
including arbitration. Outside the franchise context, several
courts have refused to enforce arbitration provisions that did
not comply with policy encompassed in state laws and have
held that the FAA did not
preempt such provisions.
For example, in Strawn v.
AFC Enterprises, Inc., I"6 a
:he viability of Texas federal district court
ritical to allow recently held that an
employer that opted out ofng their claims the Texas workers' com-
nchisors. pensation plan and also
imposed mandatory arbi-
tration had acted inconsis-
tently with the policy
underlying that state's
workers' compensation statute, that the arbitration clause
was therefore void, and that this conclusion was not preempt-
ed by the FAA." 7
Contract Law
It is well recognized that standard contractual defenses can
be used to void or at least reform an arbitration clause. Thus,
franchisees who have strong arguments of unconscionability
as to the arbitration clause should not be compelled to arbi-
trate their claims. Courts have accepted unconscionability
arguments with respect to clauses that mandate a potentially
biased arbitrator,"' that impose excessive costs, 119 or that
limit available remedies. 2 ° Two courts have also held that the
fact that a clause denies claimants access to a class action
may contribute to a finding of unconscionability. 2' Fran-
chisees who are relatively less sophisticated or experienced
will often have stronger unconscionability claims than those
who are experienced businesspersons.
Other contractual arguments have worked as well. For
example, several franchisees have defeated forum selection
clauses contained in franchise agreements using the contrac-
tual argument of no "meeting of the minds."'2 In addition,
franchisees should be able to defeat a clause where they can
make a showing of fraud'23 or duress.' 24 Note however that a
franchisee who attacks the contract in general, rather than the
arbitration clause in particular, may be required to make his
or her arguments to the arbitrator rather than a court.1
25
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Countering Franchisors' Forum Shopping Strategies
When franchisees and franchisors battle over the validity of
an arbitration clause, the location of the battleground may
prove critically important. For reasons that are not entirely
clear, both advocates and opponents of mandatory arbitration
agree that the federal courts tend to be more enthusiastic than
the state courts in enforcing mandatory arbitration provi-
sions.126 Thus, franchisor attorneys use forum shopping as an
additional procedural tool to assist them in employing arbi-
tration clauses to secure strategic advantages over fran-
chisees. Mr. Dunham has recommended that when
franchisees file suit against franchisors in state court, fran-
chisors should often file a separate suit in federal court, and
then seek not only an order compelling arbitration of the dis-
pute, but also an antisuit injunction barring the state court
from further considering the matter. 27 Despite arguments
that enjoining state courts often violates federalism princi-
ples, impinging on the legitimate authority of state courts, a
number of federal courts have acceded to both requests.28
Where franchisors seek
to have federal courts
enjoin franchisees' claims
in state court, franchisees Several fral
should be prepared to use defeated forum
a number of federal juris-
diction statutes and doc- contained in frai
trines to prevent such using the contraci
forum shopping. 
29 Fran-
chisees can potentially "meeting c
make arguments citing the
federal Full Faith and
Credit statute,1"' the Rook-
er-Feldman doctrine,' 3' the Anti-Injunction Act,' 2 traditional
equitable principles,'33 and various types of abstention. 3 4 In
general, these doctrines provide that the further the state
court action has progressed, the less subject it should be to
antisuit injunction by a federal court.
The Necessity of Legislative Reform
Legislation is currently pending in both houses of Congress
that is geared to protect at least some franchisees and distribu-
tors from mandatory arbitration. In the House of Representa-
tives, the proposed Fairness and Voluntary Arbitration Act 3 '
would permit postdispute rejection of arbitration in any "sales
and service contract." It defines these as "a contract under
which any person (including any manufacturer, importer, or
distributor) sells any product to any other person for resale to
an ultimate purchaser and authorizes such other person to
repair and service such product." The bill currently has 212
cosponsors.3 6 In the Senate, the Motor Vehicle Franchise
Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 199917 is geared to pro-
tect motor vehicle franchisees from mandatory arbitration
imposed by manufacturers and would allow them to reject
such arbitration after the dispute."' This bill has thirty-seven
Republican and Democratic cosponsors.'3 9 Franchisees may
wish to support this pending legislation or to lobby for broad-
er protections for franchisees and perhaps others. Note that
nc
s
n1c
tu
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legislation has also been introduced to protect consumers and
employees from mandatory binding arbitration. "
Conclusion
The use of binding arbitration clauses in franchise agree-
ments is controversial. There would be no consensus among
readers of this Journal as to whether or how often such
clauses are harmful to franchisees. Moreover, many debate
the empirical question of whether franchisees are typically
relatively unsophisticated individuals, deserving of protec-
tion from powerful franchisors, or whether instead they tend
to be experienced and sophisticated businesspersons who
should be held to the fine print of their contracts.
Consensus need not be reached on these issues in order
for legislatures and courts to protect franchisees. Legislatures
that conclude that franchisees are entitled to protection can
pass legislation geared to achieve those ends. Once a legisla-
ture has concluded that franchisees are entitled to protection,
courts should enforce such a provision unless the state legis-
lation is tailored so nar-
rowly to arbitration that it
is found to be preempted
hisees have by the FAA. Moreover, to
election clauses resolve questions as to
whether franchisees have
hise agreements voluntarily and knowingly
al argument of no waived their jury trial
rights, whether a particular
the minds." arbitration clause is incon-
sistent with federal
statutes, or whether that
clause is void for uncon-
scionability or other contractual reasons, courts need not
make a general determination as to the nature of franchisees.
Instead, courts need only focus on the litigants who appear
before them. Where a particular franchisee is relatively unso-
phisticated, lacks adequate legal counsel, and has been over-
whelmed by a powerful franchisor, courts should be more
willing to refuse to enforce an arbitration clause on the
ground that the franchisee did not knowingly or intelligently
waive its jury trial right or on the ground that the clause is
unconscionable. Where the terms of a particular arbitration
clause are such that the franchisee would be denied its rights
under federal law, the court should hold the clause unen-
forceable in whole or in part, even where the court believes
that arbitration is, as a general rule, permitted or even
favored. In short, courts must get beyond pro-arbitration
rhetoric and examine economic realities to determine
whether particular arbitration clauses are enforceable under
existing law.
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laws."); Thomas M. Pitegoff, Choice of Law in Franchise Relation-
ships: Staying Within Bounds, 14 FRANCHISE L.J. 89 (1995).
58. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31 (1972), citing Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
59. Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 581 (1990),
quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (Story,
J.). For commentary discussing the jury's value in bringing common
sense to bear on the facts and in checking the power of the sovereign,
see, e.g., I WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
348-50 (7th ed. 1956); Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret
the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
1005, 1035 (1992); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of
the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 653 (1973).
60. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255,
258 (2d Cir. 1977); AAMCO Transmissions Inc. v. Marino, Nos.
CIV.A.88-5522, 88-6197, 1990 WL 10024, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7,
1990); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403
(D. Colo. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 850 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir.
1988); Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1105-06
(N.D. Ill. 1994).
61. See, e.g., Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258 (refusing to enforce jury trial
waiver imposed on borrower by lender where waiver was inconspicu-
ous, where borrower had no choice but to accept contract as written to
obtain badly needed funds, and where there was a gross inequality in
bargaining power); Marino, 1990 WL 10024, at *1, *2 (refusing to
enforce provision that was no more or less conspicuous than other pro-
visions in ten-page standard form contract, because franchisees pos-
sessed virtually no bargaining power and waiver provision was not
subject to negotiation); Dreiling, 539 F. Supp. at 403 (refusing to
enforce jury trial waiver where there was no evidence that waiver was
either bargained for or brought to franchisees' attention, where fran-
chisees had little if any opportunity to negotiate clause, and where there
was inequality in the relative bargaining positions of the parties); Sulli-
van v. Ajax Navigation Corp., 881 F. Supp. 906, 910-11 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (refusing to enforce waiver on grounds that the presumption
against waiver is strong, and the burden of proving that the waiver was
"knowingly and intentionally" made rests on the party seeking to
enforce it). Note that there is a split regarding whether it is the party
seeking waiver or the party opposing waiver who carries the burden of
proof on these factors. Compare Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804
F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986) (placing burden on party seeking
enforcement of waiver), and Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258 (same) with
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985)
(placing burden on party seeking to invalidate waiver). See generally 8
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.52[3] (3d ed.) (surveying contractual
waiver of jury trial).
62. Nos. CIV.A.88-5522, 88-6197, 1990 WL 10024, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 7, 1990).
63. Marino, 1990 WL10024, at *2.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
850 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1988).
67. Dreiling, 539 F. Supp. at 403.
68. See, e.g., Telum Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835,
837 (10th Cir. 1988) (upholding contractual waiver of jury trial where
both parties were sophisticated and provision was in normal print size
of contract); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir.
1986) (enforcing jury trial waiver where agreement was only two pages
long; where parties were not manifestly unequal in bargaining positions
in that lessees, while lacking in formal education, were successful and
shrewd businessmen; where parties engaged in protracted negotiation
over contract; and where lessees insisted on handwritten modification
to proposed contract); Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694, 705-09 (E.D. La. 1999) (upholding jury
trial, despite evidence of some inequality of bargaining power, where
parties to dealership agreement were experienced businesspeople and
were represented by counsel, though counsel did not review the con-
tracts containing the jury trial waiver); Smyly v. Hyundai Motor Am.,
762 F. Supp. 428, 430 (D. Mass. 1991) (enforcing jury trial waiver
imposed on dealer that the court found was a "sophisticated business-
man," where clause was set out in capital letters in an introductory
table of contents, and where dealer admitted that he would have accept-
ed clause had he realized that it was there); Bonfield v. AAMCO
Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589, 594-96 (N.D. 111. 1989) (enforc-
ing jury trial waiver imposed on franchisee given clarity of waiver and
given boldface type, where waiver was expressly discussed, and where
franchisee was an experienced businessman who was represented by
counsel, though he chose not to have his attorney review agreement).
69. See Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339
(7th Cir. 1984) ("[T]hough perhaps not contemplated by the [plaintiffs]
when they signed the contract, loss of the right to a jury trial is a neces-
sary and fairly obvious consequence of an agreement to arbitrate.")
(emphasis omitted).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 107-20 for a brief discussion
of the preemption issues that will be raised when franchisees seek to
assert arguments under state constitutions.
71. See, e.g., Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 316-24 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that large bro-
kerage house agreed to submit to arbitration claims brought by cus-
tomers when it agreed to membership in Chicago Board of Trade and
also agreed to arbitrate certain disputes, and that it thereby waived any
rights that it may have had to appear in an Article III court or to secure
a jury trial in such court); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1470-71 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (dismissing
registered securities representative's claims implicating Article III and
the Seventh Amendment on grounds that agreement to arbitrate was
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voluntarily made and holding that no constitutional protections are at
risk if arbitration agreement is found to be valid); Illyes v. John
Nuveen & Co., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 580, 583-84 (N.D. Il. 1996) (con-
cluding that plaintiff had consented to arbitration, thereby waiving
rights to Article III forum and Seventh Amendment jury trial).
72. See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282,
286-88 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding arbitration agreement imposed on
securities customers and stating:
We know of no case holding that parties dealing at arm's length
have a duty to explain to each other the terms of a written contract.
We decline to impose such an obligation where the language of the
contract clearly and explicitly provides for arbitration....
We are unable to understand how any person possessing a basic
education and fluent in the English language could fail to grasp the
meaning of that provision [i.e., that they were waiving right to go to
court].).
McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C94-0627 FMS, 1994 WL
387852, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994) (enforcing mandatory arbitra-
tion clause imposed on group of senior citizen homeowners who
entered into "reverse mortgage loans" whereby they received cash
advances secured by equity in their homes, although plaintiffs may
well not have understood that they were waiving rights to trial, and
stating that defendants had no duty to inform plaintiffs of the ramifica-
tions of a contract clause).
73. Dunham, supra note 2, at 96.
74. The Seventh Amendment provides that "the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved" in all "[sluits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. To
assess whether an action is "at common law," courts perform a histori-
cal analysis and, where the history is not determinative, examine the
nature of the remedy sought, ordering a jury trial where the claim is
"legal" as opposed to equitable. Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494
U.S. 558, 564 (1990). To date, the Seventh Amendment has not been
applied to actions brought in state courts. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 192 n.6 (1974).
75. This, in essence, is the approach taken by the decisions dis-
cussed supra in note 71.
76. See supra note 68. See also Herman Miller, Inc. v. Thom Rock
Realty Co., 819 F. Supp. 307, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), qff'd, 46 F.3d 183
(2d Cir. 1995) (relying on New York statute to enforce jury waiver pro-
vision in action between commercial tenant and landlord); Phoenix
Leasing, Inc. v. Sure Broad., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1383-85 (D. Nev.
1994) (enforcing jury waiver against borrower in a lending agreement
where borrower was sophisticated and represented by counsel, where
waiver was not inconspicuous, where there was no evidence to suggest
that the waiver was nonnegotiable, and where the disparity of bargain-
ing power was "not the kind or degree necessary to invalidate the waiv-
er"); National Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding jury waiver provision in loan agreements
enforceable by lender against guarantor where guarantor was a sophisti-
cated businessperson and was represented by counsel, and waiver was
not inconspicuous); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 826 F. Supp. 57,
59 61 (D.R.I. 1993) (citing guarantor's business sophistication and
expertise as an attorney, the fact that guarantor was also represented by
counsel, the lack of evidence of "gross disparity in bargaining power,"
and the fact that the jury waiver was not inconspicuous in enforcing pro-
vision against lender); Tolland Getty, Inc. v. Getty Petroleum Co., No.
3:93-CV-1040 (JAC), 1993 WL 402802, at *4 5 (D. Conn. Oct. 1,
1993) (upholding waiver of jury trial as between franchisee and fran-
chisor where waiver was clearly visible in each of the three contracts
and where there was an apparent absence of "gross inequality of bar-
gaining power, where franchisee was represented by counsel, and where
franchisee initialed every page of the contracts"); ARH Distribs., Inc. v.
ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., No. 87-C-511, 1988 WL 17628, at * 1-2
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 1988) (enforcing jury waiver contained in loan agree-
ment where the distributor signed the agreement without reading it and
the waiver was nonnegotiable).
77. Note that because the Seventh Amendment has not yet been held
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 74, this
argument would have little chance of success in state courts. The ques-
tion of whether state constitutional rights might be used to defeat arbi-
tration clauses, or whether the state constitution would instead be
preempted by the FAA, is discussed infra at text accompanying notes
104 17.
78. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 & n.3
(1991).
79. Id. at 26. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
80. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-29. The Court determined that nothing
in the text, legislative history, or purpose of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act precluded mandatory arbitration on a general basis.
81. 473 U.S. 614, 628, 640 (1985).
82. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627-28.
83. See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182,
1189-90 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998) (holding
that mandatory arbitration is not penmitted under Title VII); Knepp v.
Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821, 843 45 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1999) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause in part because it created
an "inherent conflict" with Bankruptcy Code); Wilson v. Waverlee
Homes, tnc., 954 F. Supp. 1530, 1539-40 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (finding
that Magnuson-Moss Act precluded certain mandatory arbitration).
84.43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994).
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1997).
86. Graham Oil Co., 43 F.3d at 124748.
87. Id. at 1247.
88. See, e.g., Baron v. Best Buy Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1370-71
(S.D. Fla. 1999) (holding arbitration clause unconscionable in part
based on potential bias of arbitral organization, the National Arbitration
Forum, which the party seeking enforcement of the clause did not
demonstrate to be a forum that was "neutral, inexpensive and effi-
cient"); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 618-19
(D.S.C. 1998) (noting biased procedures in holding clause uncon-
scionable, calling the arbitration dictated by the clause mere "sham
arbitration" in part because clause precluded election of the arbitrator
by both parties); Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840
P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1992) (holding unenforceable a binding arbitra-
tion clause mandated by an abortion provider in part because it provid-
ed that arbitrators must be physicians specializing in obstetrics/
gynecology). See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 30 31 (1991) (refusing to strike down arbitration clause due to
general allegation of bias, but recognizing that specific evidence of bias
could be considered when evaluating the enforceability of clause); Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
634-37 & n. 19 (1985) (declining "to indulge the presumption that the
parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or
unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators,"
but implying that showing of actual bias would be sufficient to void
clause as to claims brought under antitrust statute).
89. See Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054,
1060 (11 th Cir. 1998) (refusing to compel arbitration of Title VII claims
where clause limited arbitrator to awarding only contract damages).
90. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467-69
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that race discrimination claim brought under
Title VII was arbitrable only so long as the employer paid the cost of
arbitration and meaningful appeal was afforded); Randolph v. Green
Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 178 F.3d 1149, 1157 59 (11 th Cir. 1999) (refus-
ing to compel arbitration, under Truth in Lending Act, as it was unclear
how costs would be divided), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).
91. See, e.g., Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, 186 F.R.D. 689, 691 94
(M.D. Ga. 1999); Little Caesar Enter., Inc. v. Smith, 172 F.R.D. 236,
241-45 (E.D. Mich. 1997). Cf. Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler
Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 337-4 (4th Cir. 1998) (reversing class certifi-
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cation in case where franchisee class had won substantial verdict at trial).
92. See Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270 (D. Del.
1999) (refusing to compel arbitration of claim brought under Truth in
Lending Act where it would eliminate class action remedy, reasoning
that class action was critical to enforcement of TILA), rev'd Johnson v.
West Suburban Bank, No. 00-5047, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22151 (3d
Cir. Aug. 29, 2000).
93. Id. at 266 (quoting Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d
398, 400 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing S. REP. No. 93 278, at 14 15 (1973)).
94. See Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270 (D. Del.
1999) (refusing to compel arbitration of claim brought under Truth in
Lending Act where it would eliminate class action remedy, reasoning
that class action was critical to enforcement of TILA); Brown v. Surety
Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 99-C-2405, 2000 WL 528631, at **3-4 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 24, 2000), Thompson v. Illinois Title Loans, Inc., No. 99-C-3952,
2000 WL 45493, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. I1, 2000); Sagal v. First USA
Bank, N.A., 69 F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (D. Del. 1999); Randolph v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1418-20 (M.D. Ala. 1998),
rev'd sub nom. Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1149, cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
1552 (2000); Lopez v. Plaza Fin. Co., No. 95-C-7567, 1996 WL
210073, at **2-3 (N.D. 11. Apr. 25, 1996).
95. Randolph, 178 F.3d at 1149. Although the class action issue is
not among the "questions presented" set out by the Court when it
granted certiorari in Green Tree, and although it was not addressed in
the decision issued by the Eleventh Circuit, the district court opinion
did reject plaintiffs' argument that their claim under the Truth in Lend-
ing Act was exempt from arbitration because it was brought as a class
action. 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1417-19 (M.D. Ala. 1998). Still, it is rather
unlikely that the Court will reach out to decide this issue. First, one of
the questions that the Court is considering is whether or not it was
appropriate for the Eleventh Circuit to consider an appeal from the dis-
trict court's grant of the motion to compel arbitration. If the Court
decides that the appeal was not appropriate, it presumably would not
go on to consider whether or not the district court erred. Second, even
if the Court determines that the appeal was permissible, it likely would
not choose to decide a question that was not addressed by the appellate
court and thus arguably not adequately developed in the record.
96. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 374-75 (7th Cir.
1995) (refusing to certify arbitral class action where clause was silent,
citing to body of law barring consolidation of arbitral proceedings
absent permissive language in clause); Herrington v. Union Planters
Bank, No. CIV.A.2:98CV231GR, 2000 WL 424232, at *7 (S.D. Miss.
Jan. 21, 2000) (finding that arbitration agreement lacking express lan-
guage providing for class arbitration precludes class arbitration);
Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that employee who agreed to arbitrate all
claims "may not avoid arbitration by pursuing class claims"); McCarthy
v. Providential Corp., No. C 94-0627 FMS, 1994 WL 387852, **8-9
(N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994) (noting that "the Ninth Circuit, and most
other circuits that have considered the issue, have held that a district
court is without power to consolidate arbitration proceedings absent an
authorizing provision in an arbitration agreement"); Gammaro v. Thorp
Consumer Discount Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1983) (refus-
ing to allow class arbitration where agreement does not provide for
class treatment); Lopez, 1996 WL 210073, at **2-3 (disallowing class
arbitration where clause only allows for individual arbitration). For a
detailed discussion of issues relating to class actions and arbitration, see
Jean R. Sternlight. As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. I
(forthcoming Oct. 2000) (manuscript on file with author).
97. Dunham, supra note 4; Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 4.
98. This tendency seems unwarranted given the federal policy
favoring arbitration that should be interpreted to allow class actions in
arbitration just as it allows punitive damages in arbitration; the com-
mon law rule of contract interpretation requiring courts to construe
ambiguous language against the drafter; the lack of any policy justifica-
tion for why courts should disfavor arbitral class actions; and given the
courts' inability to explain why they would be justified in prohibiting
arbitrators from choosing to permit class actions. (For a more detailed
discussion of these points, see Sternlight, supra note 96, at 179-81).
99. The analogy is inapt given: (1) the much greater consequence of
disallowing class actions as opposed to consolidations; (2) the fact that
whereas consolidation orders may well cause conflict in interpreting
multiple arbitration agreements, an order for class arbitration need not;
and (3) the fact that because arbitrators arguably need court participation
to handle class actions consistent with the Due Process Clause, court
refusals to assist again have much greater consequences than do refusals
to consolidate, which can be remedied by the arbitrators. These points
are discussed in more detail in Sternlight, supra note 96, at 174-79.
100. See, e.g., Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d
779, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that FAA did not preempt Cali
fornia's decisional law allowing classwide arbitration where the agree-
ment is silent); Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1208-10
(Cal. 1982) (stating that hybrid between arbitration and class action can
best maintain benefits of both devices), rev''d on other grounds, South-
land Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 866-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (ordering
arbitral class action).
101. See, e.g., Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209 ( stating that "[w]ithout doubt
a judicially ordered classwide arbitration would entail a greater degree
of judicial involvement than is normally associated with arbitration,"
and specifying that court would have to make numerous class deci-
sions); Dickler, 596 A.2d at 866 (concluding that trial court would need
to certify class, ensure that notice was provided, review proposed settle-
ment, and deal with potential conflicts among class representatives).
102. For a summary of interviews with such attorneys, see Sternlight,
supra note 96, at 79-83.
103. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32
(1991) (implying that arbitrators might have the authority to allow for
class actions under New York Stock Exchange rules).
104. See Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d
1013, 1016-17 (Ariz. 1992) (holding unenforceable a binding arbitra-
tion clause that all patients were required to sign where clause was pro-
vided among other preliminary forms and where it provided that
arbitrators must be physicians specializing in obstetrics/gynecology,
reasoning that waiver of jury right was not conspicuous or explicit and
clause exceeded reasonable expectations of patient); Badie v. Bank of
Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 288 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that
jury trial waiver must be "unambiguous and unequivocal" and refusing
to uphold waiver in contract offered by bank in absence of showing
that customers intended to waive such a substantial right); Seifert v.
U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 642 (Fla. 1999) (taking note of right
of access to courts in refusing to interpret arbitration clause, emphasiz-
ing that clause lacked express language compelling arbitration of par-
ticular dispute). See also GFTM v. TKN Sales, No. OOCIV0235BSJ,
2000 WL 364871, at **3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2000) (holding that
Minnesota statute mandating binding arbitration violated disputant's
right to jury trial under Seventh Amendment); Nationwide Mutual Fire
Ins. Co. v. Pinnacle Medical, Inc., 753 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2000) (holding
that state statute mandating that medical providers arbitrate disputes
with health insurance providers violates the Florida Constitution in
denying providers' right of access to courts).
105. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-14 (1998) ("A provision is
[sic] a franchise agreement restricting jurisdiction or venue to a forum
outside this state ... is void with respect to a claim otherwise enforce-
able under this act."); Pepe v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 750 A.2d 1167,
1168 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000) (interpreting Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act to preclude mandatory out-of-state forum for claims
brought under that Act); High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp.,
823 S.W.2d 493 497-500 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (invalidating forum
selection clause that was "'unreasonable" as to the franchisee); Kubis &
Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 627 (N.J.
1996) (holding forum selection clause that designated out-of-state judi-
cial forum presumptively invalid under New Jersey's Franchise Prac-
tices Act).
106. KKW Enter., Inc. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchising
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Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 49-52 (1st Cir. 1999); Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v.
Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1998); M.C. Constr. Corp. v.
Gray Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 541, 547-48 (W.D. Va. 1998). See also Man-
agement Recruiters Int'l v. Bloor, 129 F.3d 851, 856 (6th Cir. 1997)
(noting, but not holding, that state law prohibition on forum selection
clauses might be preempted). But see Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys.
Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Mont. 1998) (holding that state provi-
sions barring Montana residents from being required to litigate claims
out of state are not preempted by FAA, and that arbitration clause is
void to the extent that it mandates out-of-state arbitration). See general-
ly Edward Wood Dunham et al., Franchisor Attempts to Control the
Dispute Resolution Forum: Why the Federal Arbitration Act Trumps
the New Jersey Supreme Court's Decision in Kubis, 29 RUTGERS L.J.
237, 257-70 (1998) (arguing that decision barring franchisors' imposi-
tion of out-of-state forum selection clauses in litigation should not
apply to arbitration).
107. 517 U.S. 681 (1995).
108. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 668-88.
109. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
110. Keating, 465 U.S. at 15-16.
11!. See supra note 106.
112. See James Zimmerman, Restrictions on Forum-Selection Claus-
es in Franchise Agreements and the Federal Arbitration Act: Is State
Law Preempted?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 759, 783-86 (1998) (arguing that
state laws barring forum selection in franchise agreements should not
be held preempted by FAA, and that preempting them would ironically
"place arbitration agreements on a higher level than other contract pro-
visions") (emphasis original).
113. 971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998).
114. Keystone, Inc., 971 P.2d at 1244-45.
115. Id. at 1245.
116. 70 F. Supp. 2d 717 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
117. Strawn, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 721, 725-28. The court explained that
"[t]he FAA by its own terms allows some arbitration agreements to be
rendered unenforceable by neutral principles applicable to contracts
generally." Id. at 721. It then found that "where employers offer mini-
mal benefits and unilaterally impose an arbitral forum on their injured
employees, such a forum is sufficiently dissimilar to a judicial forum as
to undermine Texas public policy with respect to the workers' compen-
sation system." Id. at 726. The court specifically found arbitration dis-
similar to litigation in that it denies a jury trial, applies relaxed rules of
evidence, relies on arbitrators who generally have significantly differ-
ent legal expertise than judges to make decisions, and involves only
limited judicial review. Id. at 724-25. See also Avedon Eng'g, Inc. v.
Seatex, 126 F.3d 1279, 1286-88 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that FAA
does not preempt a New York law treating arbitration clause as "mater-
ial alteration" to contract that was not enforceable without express
agreement); Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67,
75-80 (Cal. 1999) (interpreting California's Consumer Legal Remedies
Act to prohibit arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief under
that Act, and concluding that such prohibition was not preempted by
FAA); Keystone, Inc., 971 P.2d at 1244-45 (holding that general provi-
sion protecting Montana citizens from mandatory out-of-state forums
was applicable to arbitration clause and was not preempted by FAA).
Cf Cline v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735 (S.D. Tex.
1999) (noting that arbitration clause linked to employer's benefit plan
in lieu of workers' compensation did not violate state public policy
because employee was given choice between plan requiring arbitration
and plan allowing litigation of disputes).
118. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582,
618-19 (D.S.C. 1998) (noting biased procedures and limitations on
remedies as among reasons for holding clause unconscionable); Baron
v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1370-71 (S.D. Fla. 1999)
(holding arbitration clause unconscionable based on potential bias of
arbitral organization).
119. See, e.g., Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821, 838
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause in part
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tion agreement called for appointment of neutral arbitrator within sixty
days of filing of claim, even though such timely appointment had
occurred in only 1 percent of cases during previous years, and where
substantial delays were attributable to HMO).
124. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Co., 500 U.S. 20, 33
(1991) ("Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported
claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the
revocation of any contract.' ") (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
125. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
404-07 (1967).
126. Jean R. Sterlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions:
Federal Courts' Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 91, 93-94 (1998); Mark R. Kravitz & Edward Wood
Dunham, Compelling Arbitration, LITIG., Fall 1996, at 34, 35.
127. Kravitz & Dunham, supra note 126, at 40.
128. See, e.g., Specialty Bakeries, Inc. v. HalRob, Inc., 129 F.3d 726,
727 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming, as modified, the district court's injunc-
tion proscribing further actions by the state court, which had refused to
stay action pending arbitration); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107
F.3d 126, 136 39 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's grant of
injunctions against state courts, despite arguments that they were
improper given Rooker-Feldman doctrine or abstention principles);
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 458 (2d Cir. 1995)
(affirming district court's stay of several state court actions in which
state courts had already entered judgment, but denying a stay of those
state courts where state res judicata principles would treat state rulings
as a final judgment).
129. Of course, it should be recognized that franchisees, as well as
franchisors, may well engage in forum shopping. See Distajo, 66 F.3d
at 441 ("This case is about forum-shopping, by one and all.").
130. Federal courts are statutorily required to give state judicial pro-
82 Franchise Law journal U Fall 2000
HeinOnline -- 20 Franchise L.J. 82 2000-2001
ceedings full faith and credit. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). This statutory
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U.S. CONST. art. IV. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this
statute to require federal courts to apply to state court judgments the
same claim preclusion and issue preclusion treatment that those judg-
ments would be afforded by the courts within the state. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996). Thus, once a
state court has progressed far enough in its own action, a federal court
is precluded from enjoining that action. See Distajo, 66 F.3d at 446-51
(determining that some state court rulings, but not others, were entitled
to full faith and credit); Towers, Perrin, Forrester & Crosby, Inc. v.
Brown, 732 F.2d 345, 347-50 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that district court
erred in granting petition to compel arbitration and in staying Califor-
nia state court action where, prior to the district court's ruling, the state
court had denied the company's petition to compel arbitration, and
where this denial had already been refused review by the state supreme
court); Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1183-84
(1 th Cir. 1981) (holding that lower court's grant of summary judg-
ment was entitled to preclusive effect in federal court), overruled on
other grounds by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466 (1 1th
Cir. 1997). See generally Sternlight, supra note 126, at 130-37.
131. This doctrine derives from two cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In essence, the doctrine provides that
federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear appeals from state courts. Courts
applying this doctrine to arbitration disputes have reached mixed
results. Compare Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F. 3d 194,
199-203 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal, based on Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine, of company's federal action seeking to compel arbitra-
tion, following rejection of motion by state court); International
Cement Aggregates, Inc. v. Antilles Cement Corp., 62 F. Supp. 2d 412,
414-16 & n.3 (D.P.R. 1999) (dismissing federal claim, based on Rook-
er-Feldman doctrine, on ground that federal court lacked jurisdiction to
hear what was effectively an appeal from a state court decision), with
Distajo, 107 F.3d at 136-38 (determining that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine was inapplicable because the federal action, having been filed
prior to the state court ruling, could not properly be characterized as an
"appeal" from the state court ruling). See generally Sternlight, supra
note 126, at 138-46.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). The Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), initial-
ly passed in 1793, currently provides that "A court of the United States
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." Id. Its
"basic purpose is to prevent 'needless friction between state and federal
courts.' " Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1972) (quoting
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9
(1940)). Clearly, the AIA does not preclude federal courts from enjoin-
ing parties from filing actions in state courts. Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965). As to pending state court actions, note
that an argument can be made that none of the exceptions to the AIA
justify allowing a federal court to enjoin a state court to support an
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